An Online experiment during the 2020 US–Iran crisis shows that exposure to common enemies can increase political polarization
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An Online experiment during the 2020 US–Iran crisis shows that exposure to common enemies can increase political polarization. / Jahani, Eaman; Gallagher, Natalie; Merhout, Friedolin; Cavalli, Nicolo; Guilbeault, Douglas; Leng, Yan; Bail, Christopher A.
I: Scientific Reports, Bind 12, Nr. 1, 19304, 2022.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - An Online experiment during the 2020 US–Iran crisis shows that exposure to common enemies can increase political polarization
AU - Jahani, Eaman
AU - Gallagher, Natalie
AU - Merhout, Friedolin
AU - Cavalli, Nicolo
AU - Guilbeault, Douglas
AU - Leng, Yan
AU - Bail, Christopher A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s).
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - A longstanding theory indicates that the threat of a common enemy can mitigate conflict between members of rival groups. We tested this hypothesis in a pre-registered experiment where 1670 Republicans and Democrats in the United States were asked to complete an online social learning task with a bot that was labeled as a member of the opposing party. Prior to this task, we exposed respondents to primes about (a) a common enemy (involving Iran and Russia); (b) a patriotic event; or (c) a neutral, apolitical prime. Though we observed no significant differences in the behavior of Democrats as a result of priming, we found that Republicans—and particularly those with very strong conservative views—were significantly less likely to learn from Democrats when primed about a common enemy. Because our study was in the field during the 2020 Iran Crisis, we were able to further evaluate this finding via a natural experiment—Republicans who participated in our study after the crisis were even less influenced by the beliefs of Democrats than those Republicans who participated before this event. These findings indicate common enemies may not reduce inter-group conflict in highly polarized societies, and contribute to a growing number of studies that find evidence of asymmetric political polarization in the United States. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for research in social psychology, political conflict, and the rapidly expanding field of computational social science.
AB - A longstanding theory indicates that the threat of a common enemy can mitigate conflict between members of rival groups. We tested this hypothesis in a pre-registered experiment where 1670 Republicans and Democrats in the United States were asked to complete an online social learning task with a bot that was labeled as a member of the opposing party. Prior to this task, we exposed respondents to primes about (a) a common enemy (involving Iran and Russia); (b) a patriotic event; or (c) a neutral, apolitical prime. Though we observed no significant differences in the behavior of Democrats as a result of priming, we found that Republicans—and particularly those with very strong conservative views—were significantly less likely to learn from Democrats when primed about a common enemy. Because our study was in the field during the 2020 Iran Crisis, we were able to further evaluate this finding via a natural experiment—Republicans who participated in our study after the crisis were even less influenced by the beliefs of Democrats than those Republicans who participated before this event. These findings indicate common enemies may not reduce inter-group conflict in highly polarized societies, and contribute to a growing number of studies that find evidence of asymmetric political polarization in the United States. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for research in social psychology, political conflict, and the rapidly expanding field of computational social science.
U2 - 10.1038/s41598-022-23673-0
DO - 10.1038/s41598-022-23673-0
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 36369344
AN - SCOPUS:85141670621
VL - 12
JO - Scientific Reports
JF - Scientific Reports
SN - 2045-2322
IS - 1
M1 - 19304
ER -
ID: 327144195