Behavioral determinants of antibiotic resistance: The role of social information
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Behavioral determinants of antibiotic resistance : The role of social information. / Boehm, Robert; Holtmann-Klenner, Cindy; Korn, Lars; Santana, Ana Paula; Betsch, Cornelia.
I: Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being, Bind 14, Nr. 3, 08.2022, s. 757-775.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Behavioral determinants of antibiotic resistance
T2 - The role of social information
AU - Boehm, Robert
AU - Holtmann-Klenner, Cindy
AU - Korn, Lars
AU - Santana, Ana Paula
AU - Betsch, Cornelia
PY - 2022/8
Y1 - 2022/8
N2 - The increasing development of resistant pathogens is one of the greatest global health challenges. As antibiotic overuse amplifies antibiotic resistance, antibiotic intake poses a social dilemma in which individuals need to decide whether to prosocially reduce their intake in the collective interest versus to (over)use it even in case of mild diseases. We devise a novel behavioral game paradigm to model the social dilemma of antibiotic intake. Using this new method in an incentivized laboratory experiment (N = 272 German participants), we varied whether players had mutual knowledge about their antibiotic intake. The results indicate that there was substantial antibiotic overuse in the absence of social information. Overuse decreased when social information was present. Our postexperimental survey data further suggest that social information impacts people's behavioral motivation, evaluation of the other player, and positive affect. Taken together, providing social information about people's antibiotic intake may help in reducing antibiotic overuse. On a more general level, the novel behavioral game may be adapted to study other aspects of antibiotic intake to promote prudent use of antibiotics.
AB - The increasing development of resistant pathogens is one of the greatest global health challenges. As antibiotic overuse amplifies antibiotic resistance, antibiotic intake poses a social dilemma in which individuals need to decide whether to prosocially reduce their intake in the collective interest versus to (over)use it even in case of mild diseases. We devise a novel behavioral game paradigm to model the social dilemma of antibiotic intake. Using this new method in an incentivized laboratory experiment (N = 272 German participants), we varied whether players had mutual knowledge about their antibiotic intake. The results indicate that there was substantial antibiotic overuse in the absence of social information. Overuse decreased when social information was present. Our postexperimental survey data further suggest that social information impacts people's behavioral motivation, evaluation of the other player, and positive affect. Taken together, providing social information about people's antibiotic intake may help in reducing antibiotic overuse. On a more general level, the novel behavioral game may be adapted to study other aspects of antibiotic intake to promote prudent use of antibiotics.
KW - antibiotic resistance
KW - antibiotics
KW - health games
KW - social dilemma
KW - social information
U2 - 10.1111/aphw.12345
DO - 10.1111/aphw.12345
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 35103398
VL - 14
SP - 757
EP - 775
JO - Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being
JF - Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being
SN - 1758-0846
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 296260667