Different games for different motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015)
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Different games for different motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015). / Thielmann, Isabel; Böhm, Robert; Hilbig, Benjamin E.
I: European Journal of Personality, Bind 29, Nr. 4, 2015, s. 506-508.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Different games for different motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015)
AU - Thielmann, Isabel
AU - Böhm, Robert
AU - Hilbig, Benjamin E.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) strongly questioned the comparability and equivalence of different mixed‐motive situations as modelled in economic games. Particularly, the authors found that different games correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioural tendencies across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually perfectly in line with the game‐theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et al.'s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over decades in economics and psychology.
AB - Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) strongly questioned the comparability and equivalence of different mixed‐motive situations as modelled in economic games. Particularly, the authors found that different games correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioural tendencies across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually perfectly in line with the game‐theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et al.'s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over decades in economics and psychology.
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2007
DO - https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2007
M3 - Journal article
VL - 29
SP - 506
EP - 508
JO - European Journal of Personality
JF - European Journal of Personality
SN - 0890-2070
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 241310740