Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas

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Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas. / Böhm, Robert; Theelen, Maik M. P.

I: Journal of Economic Psychology, Bind 54, 2016, s. 151-163.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Böhm, R & Theelen, MMP 2016, 'Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas', Journal of Economic Psychology, bind 54, s. 151-163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.04.003

APA

Böhm, R., & Theelen, M. M. P. (2016). Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas. Journal of Economic Psychology, 54, 151-163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.04.003

Vancouver

Böhm R, Theelen MMP. Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2016;54:151-163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.04.003

Author

Böhm, Robert ; Theelen, Maik M. P. / Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas. I: Journal of Economic Psychology. 2016 ; Bind 54. s. 151-163.

Bibtex

@article{bab714ab9b124afb834313bd01743ddf,
title = "Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas",
abstract = "The aim of this paper is to examine how framing influences people{\textquoteright} s cooperation behavior in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1 we investigated the influence of outcome valence (positive vs. negative outcome) and externality valence (positive vs. negative externality) framing on players{\textquoteright} willingness to cooperate in a repeated public good game. We found a significant interaction effect on first-round cooperation, indicating larger cooperation rates when there is a negative outcome valence and a positive externality on others. Furthermore, this effect remained largely stable when comparing cooperation over all rounds, resulting in 45–63% increased cooperation compared to the other conditions. In Experiment 2 we replicated the effect in an applied vignette study, lending support for the generalizability of this framing effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that public goods provisions may be increased substantially by framing the situation{\textquoteright}s outcome valence as negative rather than positive.",
author = "Robert B{\"o}hm and Theelen, {Maik M. P.}",
year = "2016",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.04.003",
language = "English",
volume = "54",
pages = "151--163",
journal = "Journal of Economic Psychology",
issn = "0167-4870",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas

AU - Böhm, Robert

AU - Theelen, Maik M. P.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - The aim of this paper is to examine how framing influences people’ s cooperation behavior in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1 we investigated the influence of outcome valence (positive vs. negative outcome) and externality valence (positive vs. negative externality) framing on players’ willingness to cooperate in a repeated public good game. We found a significant interaction effect on first-round cooperation, indicating larger cooperation rates when there is a negative outcome valence and a positive externality on others. Furthermore, this effect remained largely stable when comparing cooperation over all rounds, resulting in 45–63% increased cooperation compared to the other conditions. In Experiment 2 we replicated the effect in an applied vignette study, lending support for the generalizability of this framing effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that public goods provisions may be increased substantially by framing the situation’s outcome valence as negative rather than positive.

AB - The aim of this paper is to examine how framing influences people’ s cooperation behavior in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1 we investigated the influence of outcome valence (positive vs. negative outcome) and externality valence (positive vs. negative externality) framing on players’ willingness to cooperate in a repeated public good game. We found a significant interaction effect on first-round cooperation, indicating larger cooperation rates when there is a negative outcome valence and a positive externality on others. Furthermore, this effect remained largely stable when comparing cooperation over all rounds, resulting in 45–63% increased cooperation compared to the other conditions. In Experiment 2 we replicated the effect in an applied vignette study, lending support for the generalizability of this framing effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that public goods provisions may be increased substantially by framing the situation’s outcome valence as negative rather than positive.

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.04.003

DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.04.003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 54

SP - 151

EP - 163

JO - Journal of Economic Psychology

JF - Journal of Economic Psychology

SN - 0167-4870

ER -

ID: 241310504