The power of defaults in intergroup conflict
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The power of defaults in intergroup conflict. / Boehm, Robert; Halevy, Nir; Kugler, Tamar.
I: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Bind 168, 104105, 01.2022.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The power of defaults in intergroup conflict
AU - Boehm, Robert
AU - Halevy, Nir
AU - Kugler, Tamar
PY - 2022/1
Y1 - 2022/1
N2 - Intergroup conflict is a persistent companion of the human existence. Why do individuals engage in intergroupconflict as often as they do? We propose that groups’ tendencies to present intergroup conflict as the defaultoption and individuals’ tendencies to disproportionately choose default options fuel individual participation inintergroup conflict. Three experiments (total N = 893) that used incentivized economic games found support forthis hypothesis. Designating intergroup conflict as the default option significantly increased individual partici-pation in conflict relative to a no-default condition and to designating other behavioral options as defaults. Theeffects of defaults on intergroup conflict generalized across different social identities and levels of group iden-tification. Our findings explain the stickiness of conflict and identify choice architecture as a potential solution:changing existing defaults can redirect intergroup behavior. We discuss promising directions for future researchon the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.
AB - Intergroup conflict is a persistent companion of the human existence. Why do individuals engage in intergroupconflict as often as they do? We propose that groups’ tendencies to present intergroup conflict as the defaultoption and individuals’ tendencies to disproportionately choose default options fuel individual participation inintergroup conflict. Three experiments (total N = 893) that used incentivized economic games found support forthis hypothesis. Designating intergroup conflict as the default option significantly increased individual partici-pation in conflict relative to a no-default condition and to designating other behavioral options as defaults. Theeffects of defaults on intergroup conflict generalized across different social identities and levels of group iden-tification. Our findings explain the stickiness of conflict and identify choice architecture as a potential solution:changing existing defaults can redirect intergroup behavior. We discuss promising directions for future researchon the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.
KW - Intergroup conflict
KW - Defaults
KW - Decision making
KW - Group processes
U2 - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105
DO - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105
M3 - Journal article
VL - 168
JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
SN - 0749-5978
M1 - 104105
ER -
ID: 297044355