The power of defaults in intergroup conflict

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Standard

The power of defaults in intergroup conflict. / Boehm, Robert; Halevy, Nir; Kugler, Tamar.

I: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Bind 168, 104105, 01.2022.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Boehm, R, Halevy, N & Kugler, T 2022, 'The power of defaults in intergroup conflict', Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, bind 168, 104105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105

APA

Boehm, R., Halevy, N., & Kugler, T. (2022). The power of defaults in intergroup conflict. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 168, [104105]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105

Vancouver

Boehm R, Halevy N, Kugler T. The power of defaults in intergroup conflict. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 2022 jan.;168. 104105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105

Author

Boehm, Robert ; Halevy, Nir ; Kugler, Tamar. / The power of defaults in intergroup conflict. I: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 2022 ; Bind 168.

Bibtex

@article{972d8385547e4714a1d5d28beec1e5da,
title = "The power of defaults in intergroup conflict",
abstract = "Intergroup conflict is a persistent companion of the human existence. Why do individuals engage in intergroupconflict as often as they do? We propose that groups{\textquoteright} tendencies to present intergroup conflict as the defaultoption and individuals{\textquoteright} tendencies to disproportionately choose default options fuel individual participation inintergroup conflict. Three experiments (total N = 893) that used incentivized economic games found support forthis hypothesis. Designating intergroup conflict as the default option significantly increased individual partici-pation in conflict relative to a no-default condition and to designating other behavioral options as defaults. Theeffects of defaults on intergroup conflict generalized across different social identities and levels of group iden-tification. Our findings explain the stickiness of conflict and identify choice architecture as a potential solution:changing existing defaults can redirect intergroup behavior. We discuss promising directions for future researchon the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.",
keywords = "Intergroup conflict, Defaults, Decision making, Group processes",
author = "Robert Boehm and Nir Halevy and Tamar Kugler",
year = "2022",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105",
language = "English",
volume = "168",
journal = "Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes",
issn = "0749-5978",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The power of defaults in intergroup conflict

AU - Boehm, Robert

AU - Halevy, Nir

AU - Kugler, Tamar

PY - 2022/1

Y1 - 2022/1

N2 - Intergroup conflict is a persistent companion of the human existence. Why do individuals engage in intergroupconflict as often as they do? We propose that groups’ tendencies to present intergroup conflict as the defaultoption and individuals’ tendencies to disproportionately choose default options fuel individual participation inintergroup conflict. Three experiments (total N = 893) that used incentivized economic games found support forthis hypothesis. Designating intergroup conflict as the default option significantly increased individual partici-pation in conflict relative to a no-default condition and to designating other behavioral options as defaults. Theeffects of defaults on intergroup conflict generalized across different social identities and levels of group iden-tification. Our findings explain the stickiness of conflict and identify choice architecture as a potential solution:changing existing defaults can redirect intergroup behavior. We discuss promising directions for future researchon the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.

AB - Intergroup conflict is a persistent companion of the human existence. Why do individuals engage in intergroupconflict as often as they do? We propose that groups’ tendencies to present intergroup conflict as the defaultoption and individuals’ tendencies to disproportionately choose default options fuel individual participation inintergroup conflict. Three experiments (total N = 893) that used incentivized economic games found support forthis hypothesis. Designating intergroup conflict as the default option significantly increased individual partici-pation in conflict relative to a no-default condition and to designating other behavioral options as defaults. Theeffects of defaults on intergroup conflict generalized across different social identities and levels of group iden-tification. Our findings explain the stickiness of conflict and identify choice architecture as a potential solution:changing existing defaults can redirect intergroup behavior. We discuss promising directions for future researchon the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.

KW - Intergroup conflict

KW - Defaults

KW - Decision making

KW - Group processes

U2 - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105

DO - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.104105

M3 - Journal article

VL - 168

JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

SN - 0749-5978

M1 - 104105

ER -

ID: 297044355