Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game

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Standard

Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game. / Böhm, Robert; Betsch, Cornelia; Korn, Lars.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bind 131, Nr. Part B, 2016, s. 183-195.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Böhm, R, Betsch, C & Korn, L 2016, 'Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, bind 131, nr. Part B, s. 183-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.008

APA

Böhm, R., Betsch, C., & Korn, L. (2016). Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 131(Part B), 183-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.008

Vancouver

Böhm R, Betsch C, Korn L. Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2016;131(Part B):183-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.008

Author

Böhm, Robert ; Betsch, Cornelia ; Korn, Lars. / Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game. I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2016 ; Bind 131, Nr. Part B. s. 183-195.

Bibtex

@article{5fd3dfaf385d4e96a515ee94e19e42b4,
title = "Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game",
abstract = "This paper provides an experimental game model – the Interactive Vaccination (I-Vax) Game – in order to investigate the behavioral consequences of risks from disease and from vaccination, and the epidemiological interdependence of vaccination decisions. Results from a controlled laboratory experiment provide evidence for selfish-rational non-vaccination: individuals react to the interactive incentive structure and make strategic vaccination decisions. We also find support for additional psychological factors determining behavior: individuals with stronger positive other-regarding preferences are more likely to vaccinate. Moreover, costs from action (vaccine-adverse events) have a stronger impact on behavior than costs from inaction (disease), which is evidence for the omission bias. Overall, we suggest that variants of the I-Vax Game can contribute to a better understanding of vaccination behavior and vaccine hesitancy. It can further be a useful experimental tool for testing interventions aiming at increasing vaccine uptake.",
author = "Robert B{\"o}hm and Cornelia Betsch and Lars Korn",
year = "2016",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.008",
language = "English",
volume = "131",
pages = "183--195",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "Part B",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game

AU - Böhm, Robert

AU - Betsch, Cornelia

AU - Korn, Lars

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - This paper provides an experimental game model – the Interactive Vaccination (I-Vax) Game – in order to investigate the behavioral consequences of risks from disease and from vaccination, and the epidemiological interdependence of vaccination decisions. Results from a controlled laboratory experiment provide evidence for selfish-rational non-vaccination: individuals react to the interactive incentive structure and make strategic vaccination decisions. We also find support for additional psychological factors determining behavior: individuals with stronger positive other-regarding preferences are more likely to vaccinate. Moreover, costs from action (vaccine-adverse events) have a stronger impact on behavior than costs from inaction (disease), which is evidence for the omission bias. Overall, we suggest that variants of the I-Vax Game can contribute to a better understanding of vaccination behavior and vaccine hesitancy. It can further be a useful experimental tool for testing interventions aiming at increasing vaccine uptake.

AB - This paper provides an experimental game model – the Interactive Vaccination (I-Vax) Game – in order to investigate the behavioral consequences of risks from disease and from vaccination, and the epidemiological interdependence of vaccination decisions. Results from a controlled laboratory experiment provide evidence for selfish-rational non-vaccination: individuals react to the interactive incentive structure and make strategic vaccination decisions. We also find support for additional psychological factors determining behavior: individuals with stronger positive other-regarding preferences are more likely to vaccinate. Moreover, costs from action (vaccine-adverse events) have a stronger impact on behavior than costs from inaction (disease), which is evidence for the omission bias. Overall, we suggest that variants of the I-Vax Game can contribute to a better understanding of vaccination behavior and vaccine hesitancy. It can further be a useful experimental tool for testing interventions aiming at increasing vaccine uptake.

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.008

DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 131

SP - 183

EP - 195

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

IS - Part B

ER -

ID: 241309984