Selfish-rational non-vaccination: Experimental evidence from an interactive vaccination game
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
This paper provides an experimental game model – the Interactive Vaccination (I-Vax) Game – in order to investigate the behavioral consequences of risks from disease and from vaccination, and the epidemiological interdependence of vaccination decisions. Results from a controlled laboratory experiment provide evidence for selfish-rational non-vaccination: individuals react to the interactive incentive structure and make strategic vaccination decisions. We also find support for additional psychological factors determining behavior: individuals with stronger positive other-regarding preferences are more likely to vaccinate. Moreover, costs from action (vaccine-adverse events) have a stronger impact on behavior than costs from inaction (disease), which is evidence for the omission bias. Overall, we suggest that variants of the I-Vax Game can contribute to a better understanding of vaccination behavior and vaccine hesitancy. It can further be a useful experimental tool for testing interventions aiming at increasing vaccine uptake.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Vol/bind | 131 |
Udgave nummer | Part B |
Sider (fra-til) | 183-195 |
ISSN | 0167-2681 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2016 |
ID: 241309984